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Thing Theory  
 
 
Graham Harman, Heidegger Explained: From Phenomenon to Thing, Chicago and La Salle, 
IL: Open Court, pp x, 193. 
 
 
We are all inclined to take the climate for granted. We are basically acclimatised to the 
seasonal cycle and most of the variations that occur from day to day and week to week. 
It is all too easy to forget just how much of this comfort depends on the fact that our 
buildings, food and energy supplies, health and transport systems and leisure activities 
are carefully designed to meet the challenges of the local climate. But when extreme 
events occur, it becomes acutely apparent how vulnerable much of the infrastructure of 
society is to climatic fluctuations.  (Burroughs, 2001: ix). 
 
So begins a recent primer on climate change by physicist William J Burroughs that I’ve been 
finding helpful. Climate change and other geophysical upheavals have been keeping me busy 
lately. Too busy, in fact, to make it through Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time, which sits 
half read on a high shelf. Heidegger’s philosophy, I’m aware, has frequently been set to work 
by fellow writers and commentators grappling with environmental issues. Radical ecologists, 
in particular, have taken inspiration from his critique of modern technology,  finding much to 
empathise with in the German philosopher’s  preference for the authenticity of rural life over 
the banalities of urban industrialism and his condemnation of the way that the whole earth is 
being reduced to `standing reserve’ for the imperatives of production.   
 
This sort of critique, I confess, never quite convinced me of the need to engage with 
Heidegger - beyond a cursory reading of a couple of his better known short pieces. An 
antipathy to nostalgia, a wariness of  the couplet of soil and belonging, and a preference for 
more redemptive readings of technology saw me heading off in the direction of philosophers 
who were less encumbered by notions of  `being’, and more enthralled with `becoming’.  
Grappling with global climatic instabilities, and other catastrophes of human or other-than-
human origin, I turned for inspiration not to the advocates of dwelling in place and gathering 
in, but to the theorists of monstrous energy and roiling excess, the celebrants of restless 
change and endless recombinance.  
 
That is, until I encountered Graham Harman’s Heidegger, a figure who turned out to be rather 
different from the Heidegger of my imagination and passing acquaintance. The appeal for me 
of Harman’s take on the 20th century’s most famous philosopher is not so much that he casts 
new light on the indecencies inflicted by modern humankind on a vulnerable planet. It isn’t 
what he says about the dealings of humanity at all. It’s more what he has to say about things 
that aren’t necessarily human, or even associated with humankind. It’s about how Heidegger 
might help us to think through a universe packed with objects and events that generally go 
about their business without any great regard for human agency – a cosmos that doesn’t 
revolve around us, that never did and never will.  
 
But that’s getting ahead of ourselves.  Harman’s Heidegger Explained is, on the whole, a 
rather more inclusive and less idiosyncratic entry point to the philosopher’s work than I have 
been insinuating. Reading as a genuine ingénu, Harman’s text seems to me to do all the things 
one might expect and wish for from an introduction. It brings Heidegger as a person and as a 
thinker to life by weaving together major developments in his work with historical and 
biographical events, it tracks the formative influences on his thought and the conversations 
and exchanges that nourished his writings, it surveys his major texts and lecture courses, and 
explains his most important concepts. Credit is given unreservedly for Heidegger’s major 
intellectual achievements: Harman is as unafraid of superlatives as he is of confronting his 
protagonist’s personal flaws, moments of misjudgement, and notorious political leanings.    
 
The story-telling is accessible, and often amusing. The story itself, however, is all about 
inaccessibility. It is, as I suggested above, a tale about the withdrawal of things themselves 
into their own secretive worlds. This is the recurrent motif of Heidegger Explained, the 
refrain around which sub-themes and details are threaded. It first emerges out of a discussion 
of Heidegger’s engagement with the work of his teacher Edmund Husserl. The conversation 
with Husserl is important for the obvious reason that it sets up the accomplishment that 
Heidegger is most famous for  -  his critique of the idea of the pure, unmediated presence of 
the world,  and because this discovery informs all the subsequent denunciations of the 
metaphysics of  presence that have been such a staple of post-structural thought. But it is also 
salient for the way that it prepares the ground for Harman’s own twist on Heidegger.   
 
Harman recounts how Husserl came to the conclusion that not only the natural sciences, but 
most of the canon of philosophy has wrongly assumed that the reality of things could be made 
fully present in human consciousness. According to Husserl’s `philosophy of phenomena’, the 
objects on which we focus our attention only ever reveal to us certain facets or attributes -  all 
the while concealing a great deal more (18). In place of pure presence, then, what we 
apprehend of any entity is no more than a compendium of our perceptions of it, from all the 
vantage points available to us. Absorbing this insight, Heidegger quickly pushed it further, 
making the claim that how objects become present in our mind offers no more of a sure 
handle on the truth than any other kind of access.  Putting the emphasis on presence for 
human consciousness - the achievement of Husserlian phenomenology, then, was not enough 
of a break with natural science’s positing of physical presence in the universe. For Heidegger, 
as Harman puts it, `both science and phenomenology only see things from the outside, failing 
to grasp their turbulent ambiguous depths’ (44). And what goes for phenomenology goes for 
practically the entirety of western philosophy, from the Ancient Greeks to Descartes, from 
Kant to our contemporaries: being is reduced to presence at the expense of the absence or 
impenetrability that imbues the very nature of the objects which comprise our worlds.  
 
The book traces the development of this key idea through Heidegger’s career. Harman guides 
us in gentle steps from the early lecture in 1919, when Heidegger begins his radicalisation of 
phenomenology, through the 1923 lecture series Ontology where the idea of the inherent 
concealment of phenomena is deepened and extended, and on to the masterwork Being and 
Time, where (as the majority of commentators proclaim) the critique of presence comes to full 
fruition. Being and Time earns a chapter of its own, and here Harmon zeroes in, 
unsurprisingly, on the famous broken tool  episode; the moment where Heidegger uses a 
minor mishap to demonstrate how much of the world we habitually leave unnoticed or 
unexamined, and how the simple malfunction of an everyday object can suddenly rupture this 
taken-for-grantedness. When the hammer’s head and handle part company, what suddenly 
becomes conspicuous is the irritating fragility of the things we rely upon. Just as importantly, 
Harman underlines, what is also revealed is the background murmur of things unobtrusively 
ticking over and performing the tasks we expect of them. And this `tool-analysis’, he 
announces, `is perhaps the greatest moment of twentieth-century philosophy’ (63).   
 
But is this moment so earth-shattering because it tells us something novel and interesting 
about our use of tools? Is it primarily a meditation on technology, and what happens when 
technology goes wrong? As Harman would have it, there is much more than this at stake 
when Heidegger speaks of tools breaking and `equipment’ letting us down. `Equipment’ or 
what Heidegger also calls `readiness-to-hand’  refers not only to that aspect of  tools that we 
habitually take for granted, but to that side of  all the entities around us that we 
characteristically ignore and overlook  as they go about their  business.  Thus, in Harman’s 
example  `the chair we are sitting in, the floor that supports it, the solid earth beneath the 
floor, the oxygen we breathe, or the heart and kidneys that keep us alive’ are each in their 
own way equipment:  they are all for the most part `ready-to-hand’ rather than `present’ (62). 
Just like the earth’s climate, we might add. To be equipment, then, is not just to be put to any 
specific use, but to be part of the complex mesh of bits and pieces, entities and events, that 
make up what we experience as the `world’.  And it is this positing of the ubiquitous and 
inevitable tension between functional tool and broken tool, between concealing and revealing, 
between readiness-to-hand and presence, Harman insists, that is Heidegger’s one great 
contribution to western thought.  
 
From where I stand, at a safe distance from the bulk of Heidegger’s work and the extensive 
commentary it has attracted, there are two pleasant surprises that accompany the particular 
stress that Harman puts on the broken tool story.  
 
The first is that, while I had anticipated that Heidegger would have profound things to say 
about time (and especially the human experience of time haunted by impending death), I 
didn’t expect a take on his work that had some rather interesting things to say about space. In 
fact, Harman rather radically demystifies Heidegger on time, suggesting that most of his 
pontificating on temporality is little more than iteration of the dominant 
concealment/revealing refrain. `Time simply refers to the mysterious way in which everything 
that appears or comes to presence is shadowed by a bottomless depth of concealed reality – 
every moment is an event, and an event is never fully visible, definable or describable’ (48).  
Although he touches on Heidegger’s concern with the way human life is lived in the shadow 
of eventual death, Harman doesn’t let this case of a very big and final departure overwhelm 
the more mundane experience of dwelling amidst multitudes of a less portentous withdrawals.  
And this concern with the ordinariness of flickering presence and absence turns out to be at 
least as much about space as it is about time. As Harman has it,  Heidegger’s favoured term 
for human existence -  Dasein  ( literally `being there’) is, in an important sense, inherently 
spatial, given that it puts the stress on our location in the world, and evokes an  interplay of 
proximity and distance as constitutive of this positioning (35).  Or to put it another way, 
human being - in and through its inescapable entanglement with equipment - is inherently 
relational.   
 
A lot of recent work in geography, sociology and related social sciences has concerned itself 
with the critique of the objectivity of space, exploring the claim in a variety of ways that 
space is not an emptiness which is then filled by collections of objects, but is itself composed 
out of the relations between things; things which only exist by virtue of their collisions, 
meetings and mergers with other things. Harman presents Heideggarian readiness-to-hand as, 
in certain respects, precursory of this sort of `relational’ spatial thought, in the way that it 
proposes that our experience of space emerges through our encounter with the whole system 
of interwoven, interacting objects. The spatiality of the world’, he writes ` is primarily a 
spatiality of equipment, in which everything has its own proper place and its own significance 
(35).  
 
But things are a little more complicated than this, for Heidegger is not just another relational 
spatial thinker who happened to get in early. The very idea that things are inherently 
mysterious and unfathomable - that they come replete with hidden dimensions -  gestures  
toward something more than merely an obscurity that arises out of their complex 
entanglement with other things. As Harman reminds us, Heidegger believed that human 
beings were occasionally privy to the impenetrability of things, at those moments when the 
normal spatial relation of readiness-to-hand broke down. This is our own unique faculty. 
Other entities, devoid of our perceptual and cognitive abilities, have no access to such 
insights. So while we, on special occasions, might truly `touch’ other entities, ` a chair can 
never touch a wall, because these objects have no way of encountering one another, even if 
their physical bodies are in direct contact’ (61). One important implication of this, as Harman 
would have it, is that it implies an obduracy, an impenetrability, which is a quality of things 
all of their own, quite aside from that opacity that emerges out of the messiness of their 
mutual inter-relating.  
 
It is this `internal’ unfathomability of things, it seems to me, that starts to open up issues that 
most contemporary theories of relationality, in the social sciences at least, would find hard to 
digest - for it intimates that there are qualities and facets of `things themselves’ that are 
irreducible, even immune, to what is usually thought of as `relating’. To be sure, Heidegger 
Explained only offers hints of this challenge to relational thinking. For a fuller exploration of 
this theme, we need to look at Harman’s pair of monographs that extrapolate from 
Heidegger’s tool analysis: Tool Being (2002) and Guerrilla Metaphysics (2005), in which he 
delves at great depths into the inner obscurity of things. But that’s another story and a 
different review.   
 
Heidegger’s claim that human beings, and human beings only, have the ability to break 
though and grasp the enigma of equipment brings me to the other surprise that this little book 
delivers.  Unlike almost all previous philosophers, Heidegger resists any idea that humans are 
privileged by their capacity to know the world as it really is. This, as we have seen, is his 
single greatest achievement. But as Harman insists, this idea that human beings alone can 
transcend their absorption in the opacity of the ready-at-hand still puts us at the centre of 
everything. In keeping with the dominant tenor of western philosophy, the rest of the world 
only gains its significance from the way it is apprehended by our species. No humans on the 
scene, in other words, no truth, no world.  
 
It is around this issue that Harman starts to do something with Heidegger’s thought that feels 
a little like what Heidegger did with the work of Husserl. That is, grab hold of the most 
radical bit and push it further. We can catch this beginning to happen when Harman plays 
what he tells us is a perennial game amongst Heideggerian scholars: make a case for what is,  
(after everyone’s favourite Being and Time) , the philosopher’s second greatest hit. His own 
choice, so he informs us, is an unpopular one: a seventy page lecture, delivered in 1949 
entitled Insight Into What Is. Why Harman chooses this `strange masterpiece’ is that he 
detects in it a subtle shift away from the assumption that human beings need to be present to 
give reality its meaning: a turn in the direction of `the independent thinghood of the thing’ 
(130). As Harman seems to imply, this sense that concealment or lack of presence inheres in 
objects themselves, rather than just arising out of our encounter with them, is bubbling under 
in all Heidegger’s most searching theorising of things. It just never quite surfaces, until the 
tantalising glimpse which comes in this mid-to-late-career lecture.    
 
The second surprise, then, is that Heidegger’s discoveries about the play of presence and 
absence have the potential to lead us away from a human-centred perspective on worldly 
existence and into a conceptual realm where other-than-human entities are fully licensed to do 
their own thing.  To really stretch Heidegger’s thought on what it might mean to recoup 
reality from human access to it is to go a step beyond what the philosopher himself made of 
his own insights, and as Harman concedes, this is inappropriate for an introductory text (134). 
Once again, to catch Harman in full flight on the secret life of other-than-human things we 
must look beyond the current volume to Tool Being and Guerrilla Metaphysics: weightier 
tomes which set out from the premise that Heidegger’s work is bursting with potential 
unrecognised by its author to confront the mysteries and machinations of things themselves. 
That being said, this turn is clearly signposted at the close of Heidegger Explained, when 
Harman states his own position. `Although human Dasein’s involvement with things brings 
them into an ambiguous interplay of presence and absence,’ he writes, `the same is true of the 
things with respect to each other’ (162).  
 
Which brings me back to my opening quote. Burroughs’ point about climate being taken for 
granted until extreme weather events exceed the capacity of our technological systems to cope 
clearly chimes with classic Heideggerian tool analysis.  But it’s important to keep in mind 
that Burroughs is easing us into an exploration of climate change that is not simply about 
human-induced climate change, nor even about the human experience of variable climatic 
conditions in general. His book focuses on the inherent volatility and changeability of our 
planet’s climatic systems, drawing attention both to those aspects of climate dynamics that are 
relatively well deciphered, and those that are `shadowy and surrounded by controversy’(3). 
Indeed, Burroughs concedes that some of the physical systems that determine our planet’s 
weather are so inherently complex as to defy our full understanding , and are thus likely to 
remain `wholly unpredictable’ (8). `It is this mixture of the well established and the 
unknown’, he muses, `which make the subject so hard to pin down and so fascinating’ (3). 
 
Or as Harman might say, this is precisely what makes everything so hard to pin down and so 
worthy of intrigue. An atmospheric physicist by professional specialisation, Burroughs is no 
closet Heideggarian, as far as I’m aware. And there is nothing unusual about this kind of 
movement between knowing and unknowing, shadowiness and revelation in contemporary 
science writing. Whether its in response to pressing issues like global environmental problems 
or disaster prediction, or whether the focus is more `purely’ with the working of our planet’s 
physical systems, scientists these days are routinely willing to acknowledge the inherent 
indeterminacy or unpredictability of many of their objects of inquiry. Just as they are often 
happy to affirm their own `wonderment for the immensity and complexity of the Earth’s 
climate’, along with the other components of the cosmos that concern them (Burroughs, 2001: 
274). 
 
What I am trying to say here is that Harman is offering us a timely and relevant Heidegger, 
one who might converse in generative ways with some of the most vital issues that spring 
forth from this mysterious, intermittently broken planet on which we find ourselves: a 
conversation that in no way needs to exclude the pronouncements of natural science. And just 
as Harman’s vision of Heidegger as the theorist of readiness-to-hand engages in a usefully 
vexing manner with a range of `relational’ theories fashionable in social science and the 
humanities, so too does a Heidegger massaged into a spokesman for the independent activism 
of things mesh in productive ways with a lot of contemporary social and cultural thinking 
around the issue of `other-than-human’ agency.   
 
Needless to say, these two themes are closely related, for much of the current contingent of  
relational thinking deals explicitly with the issue of encounters, assemblies and networks 
which cross-over between the spheres formerly known as `the social’ and `the natural’ – and 
thereby bring their traditional duality into question. And once again, Harman’s Heidegger 
resists simple absorption  into the stream of relational culture-nature studies now on offer - on 
account of the way that the inner obscurity of independent things raises a challenge to the 
prioritising of the relations between different kinds of things. Effacing the boundary between 
nature and society ceases to be such a big deal when the really important borderline is that 
which persists, in whatever domain we chose, between presence and absence or knowing and 
unknowing.  
 
This modest-sized introduction, however, is not the place to go for any exploration of 
potential dialogues with recent turns in social thought. Again, that is another story.  Where 
Harman does leave off, however, is with a provocative signalling of a possible liaison 
between continental and analytic philosophy. Or rather, with a suggestion that bridging 
between the deeply divided philosophical traditions - both of which (despite their other 
animosities) privilege the issue of human access to the world of things - might itself be a 
moribund project.  Instead, he hints, a Heidegger-inspired plunge into the unfathomable 
depths of things themselves might offer a way out of the human-centred morass on either 
sides of the philosophical divide, a path that could appeal to both camps. And if there is a 
more innervating way to wind up an introduction to a dead thinker, I’d like to see it.   
 
Heidegger Explained, it seems to me, is a very generous and generative point of entry into the 
universe of one of the more daunting luminaries of 20th century thought. It wouldn’t be a bad 
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